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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to trace a logical, binary outline of the classical period 
of western civilisation, from which the gender division of political space has emerged. 
This gender division has been deepened by an excluding tension which divides the polis 
and the oikos into two distinct spheres; these are marked by a structural asymmetry 
between the citizenry and female subordination. In closing, two other points will be 
briefly made, which are recalled by the bodily figures of Penelope and Antigone.
Keywords 
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Resumen 
El artículo pretende trazar, en la edad clásica de nuestra civilización occidental, el 
esquema lógico binario del que sobresale la división de género del espacio político. Esta 
se fundamenta en la tensión excluyente que encierra la polis y el oikos en dos distintas 
dimensiones, caracterizadas por una discordancia constitutiva de la ciudadanía y de la 
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subordinación femenina. Finalmente se evocan brevemente dos líneas de fuga represen-
tadas por las figuras corpóreas de Penélope y de Antígona.
Palabras clave 
Polis, oikos, kratos, el género.
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Departing from the consideration that politics is contextualised in a public space, 
I will attempt to locate the codification of its antithetical, mirror image relationship, 
and ask as to how the contextualisation of politics supports – by definition – differences 
of gender and the definability of a public versus a private space. As has been described 
for centuries in the west, the scenario of such a codification is Greek. This scenario 
establishes well-defined boundaries via the legitimisation of pairs of concepts, which 
reinforce the binary nature of traditional logic.
The relationship of equivalence binding public-private binomials – body-mind, 
man-woman – enucleates a theoretical space from which we can attempt to articulate a 
genealogy of gender difference. Indeed, the very first terms of these pairings indicate the 
unity of a public space which is socially shared, dwelt in by men as equals, assigned to 
exercising the notion of nous. Nous is understood not only as a speculative activity but 
as a portal to acting ethically and, therefore, politically.
If the aspiration of Greek man is fulfilled within the agorà, it is because it borders the 
perimeter of a shared space in which man is free only because he is amongst equals. The 
manner of articulation of this sharing is mirrored in the concept of a folded constitution 
when the necessity to educate the citizen-man in exercising virtue becomes pressing. 
“Excellence itself, arête, […] has always been assigned to the public realm where one 
could excel, could distinguish oneself from all others. […] For excellence, by definition, 
the presence of other is always required, and this presence needs the formality of the 
public, constituted by ones’ peers, it cannot be the casual, familiar presence of one’s 
equals or inferiors”1.
Thus, the spatial-temporal situated emergence of an individual (5th century BC in 
Athens) renders as urgent a more cogent definition of the type of training involved in 
practising aretè. This individual has the right of speech and a public existence, and both 
are bound by his capability to practise virtue. “Therefore the great educational move-
ment, […] which is the origin of the European idea of culture, necessarily started from 
and in the city-state of the 5th-century”2. 
The proposal of the Sophists should be seen from this point of view, one which 
simultaneously reveals its democratic and elitist nature. Such a characteristic shapes 
the entire constitution of man who is already (in that, he is educable) a free citizen, to 
whom access to knowledge is consented. Political Paideia is one construction of such 
1. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, pp. 48-49. On Plato’s study by Arendt, 
cfr. S. Forti, Hannah Arendt tra filosofia e politica, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2006.
2. W. Jaeger, Paideia, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, vol. 1, 1946, p. 288.
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knowledge, whose formation occurs simultaneously as an ideal form of the polis takes 
shape. Such an event occurred from the VI century BC when Cleisthenes conceived 
of Athens as a city governed by isonomia. The latter can be defined as the unity of the 
intellectual environment, the symmetry between physical and civic space, the solidarity 
of philosophy and public life3. The agorà was the centre of such a space, the very same 
spatialization of isonomia. It involved all citizens – differentiated by family, residency, 
wealth – who acquired the status of isoi and homoioi, being equal and similar to each 
other. On the one hand opposing all the civic space at the centre and, on the other hand, 
ordering this space around itself, with each particular position being determined by its 
own starting point and being related to it4. Thus, when equality of rights is possible, 
locating the space of the agorà isolates the social sphere of each individual in this private 
existence; for the Greeks, this is a political act.
The postulate, according to which an individual is born with an imprint of the good, 
turns the constitutive axis to the practice of virtue, with the notion of good ever present5. 
Whilst being legitimized by diverging opinions, the Sophist and Socratic methodologies 
share the same objectives, that is, to teach aretè. This makes possible the moulding of 
man who, in the private sphere, has a dominating/dominated relationship; contempo-
raneously aretè can forge a citizen, who is capable of participating in the public sphere 
as isos and homoios. The thread uniting these two poles is supported by the concept of 
enkrateia. Sharing the same root with kratos, enkrateia implies a capability of self-dom-
inance, an essential condition of being virtuous.
Indeed, enkrateia – as a “form of effort and control that the individual must apply 
to himself in order to become moderate (sophron)”6 – establishes sophrosune. This can 
be defined as the capability to control one’s desires and pleasures, according to reason. 
Therefore, even if rationally sophrosune may function correctly, it is insufficient to know 
good; it is necessary to manage and control one’s impulses and passions. This makes 
being virtuous not a “state of integrity”, but “a relationship of domination, a relation of 
mastery”7.
3. J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Etudes de psychologie historique, Librairie Françoise Maspero s.a., Paris 1965. 
See C. Meier, Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1980, especially cap. IV; 
L. Canfora, Il mondo di Atene, Laterza, Bari, 2011.
4. J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs.
5. See G. Duso, “Platone e la filosofia politica”, in G. M. Chiodi, R. Gatti (eds), La filosofia politica di Platone, Franco Angeli, 
Milano, 2008, pp. 9-23.
6. M. Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, Vintage Books, New York, 1990, p. 65.
7. Ibidem, p. 70.
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The polemos animating such a relationship justifies intervention which pursues the 
forming of good via the askesis to virtue. In the context of the polis, the virtue of enk-
rateia occupies a privileged position in that it serves as a point of equilibrium between 
the asymmetry of a private relationship and the symmetry of a public relationship. 
“Governing oneself, managing one’s estate, and participating in the administration of 
the city were three practices of the same type”. And thus it is for this reason that “the 
master of himself and the master of others received the same training”8.
Constituting master of oneself permits the individual to modulate and extend the 
applicability of kratos. In a city which has still not separated the political from the so-
cial, kratos is placed as the centre of equidistance, symmetry and reciprocity between 
individuals by unifying both into the public sphere. Placing power at the centre means 
removing the privileges of supremacy of each single individual so that no-one may 
dominate anyone. Fixed at the centre, kratos becomes common to all members of the 
collective. For citizens of a city, placing kratos at the centre is the same as asserting one’s 
freedom from any yoke9.
The agorà is, therefore, that space in which power cancels one’s own authoritarian 
value, projecting an isonomic dimension onto the participants and thereby guaran-
teeing freedom to those who have a right to enter the polis. The agorà simultaneously 
asserts differences in social functions, which are ascribed to an individual, and the 
equality of political prerogatives. Both permit each individual to be free – auto-nomos 
– that is, participate, together with others, in the institutions of law10.
The ‘neutralisation’ of kratos defines the politeia, it expresses the very same essence of 
each social life; whomsoever is outwith the politieia is, in a certain way, out of society11. 
However, kratos contains, in its most ancestral roots, the same idea of force without 
exhausting its semantic extent. The latter is limited to controlling one’s own passions, 
given the prospect of being virtuous. It is not sufficient to deny one’s own desires; it is 
necessary to assert power, to displace the idea of domination towards others. The latter 
do not live in the space of the polis because they are not citizens. The denial of the right 
of speech to those unequal and not free may, therefore, constitute the construction of a 
separate space. Having divested the citizen of his spoils, it is here that the individual can 
and must exercise power.
8. Ibidem, p. 76 e p. 77.
9. J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. 
10. See C. Castoriadis, La democratie comme procédure et comme régime, in Les carrefours du labyrinthe, IV, La montée de 
l’insignifiance, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1996, pp. 221-241.
11. J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs.
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Such a condition is not meant as a torment to the individual but as a development of 
the way of thinking and performing kratos. Originally, kratos was conceived of as power, 
the force of coercion, which was attributed in the highest degree to the gods, to whom 
men devotedly submitted themselves. Similarly, it is this idea of kratos which men prac-
tise before the constitution of politeia, but above all it is this idea of kratos which justifies 
the neutralisation of kratos en mesoi (at the centre). Such a weakened power thus be-
comes equidistant between all citizens, thereby protecting its symmetry and reciprocity. 
It is this foundation which governs the ethics of sophrosune, as a result of the practising 
of enkrateia: a moral idea [which] is oriented towards social reality, tending to shape it12. 
Thus, the dual nature of Greek ethics reveals itself as a human discipline, which is au-
tonomous and demanding of an solid foundation; the work of Socrates monumentally 
summarises this discipline.
The twofold nature of kratos, “to command and obey” – cohabiting harmoniously 
within the same individual – [indeed] “ceases to appear as antithetical; it forms the 
boundaries of the same reversible relationship. The same men obey and command, 
according to the ordering of time, which is numerically regulated. This is because kra-
tos revolves around a common centre, the seat of the power to command. An abstract 
ordering of the egalitarian distribution of tasks substitutes the brutal force of domina-
tion”13 (isonomia). Possessing – as an objective – a constitution of reciprocally-equal 
citizens is indicative of the end of isonomia. The latter may be sought by means of an 
other-directed relationship in which the master manages a specific relationship, envis-
aged by him and according to terms which must be obeyed. Thus, the formative context 
of the manner in which the educator/educated relationship is expressed faithfully rep-
resents the twofold nature of kratos.
Where can the citizen of the polis exercise his command? Within the space of in-
equality, the space of oikos, in which inequality is legitimate, due to its mirror image 
to the polis. Hannah Arendt has underlined this: “the polis was distinguished from the 
household in that it knew only “equals” whereas the household was the center of the 
strictest inequality”14. It is only within this framework that the space of the oikos is hab-
itable. How is the space of the oikos defined? Precisely by its constitution oikos reveals 
its mirror image with the space of the polis. Also oikos is a territory conceived of and 
articulated around the notion of a centre, around, that is, the notion of being fixed. And 
12. J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. 
13. Ibidem.
14. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, cit., p. 32.
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this is the starting point for measuring the movements of the surrounding space. This 
is the play between Hestia and Hermes. Hestia, inner, closed, fixed, the folding in on 
itself of a human group; Hermes, outside, opening, mobility, contact with others who 
are different. It can be said that the Hermes-Hestia coupling expresses in its polarity the 
tension existing within the archaic representation of space. Space requires a centre, a 
fixed point, a privileged, valued position; departing from this point, guidance, varying 
in nature, can be oriented and given. However, space is present contemporaneously as 
a place of movement and this implies the possibility of transition and the passage from 
any point to another15.
In the stillness of the domestic hearth, presided over by Hestia, divinity of the 
house, one can reflect on the stability of Hestia koinè; its symbolic, religious mean-
ing fading away to be transformed into political meaning: at the centre of the city, 
hestia koinè keeps the memory of the family hearth alive. “The domestic alter, 
secured to the ground, fixes the human home to a determined point on the earth; 
this distinguishes it from every other type of oikos whilst conferring a special, 
religious quality […]. Having become commonplace, hestia koinè is built on a 
public space and open to the agorà, no longer within a private dwelling […], by 
now the hearth expresses the centre, in that it is the common denominator of all 
the houses which comprise the polis”16.
The polarity between Hestia and Hermes surrounds the typology of the relation-
ships of man and woman; and thus is it with the complementarity between the closed 
and unmovable space of the hearth, and open space of the social relationships of the 
agorà. How is it possible to collocate woman presiding over the hearth, and at the same 
time, locate the locus of male control within the oikos? The oikos constitutes the only 
territory where man can exercise his power; the fact of not being amongst equals jus-
tifies the subjection of beings inferior to himself: slaves, children, women. However, 
woman occupies a privileged position within the home in that she preserves the private 
space of man.
Such a contradiction is revealed to be fictitious but it deepens the relationship be-
tween woman and man. On marrying, the position of woman shifts, or better, is trans-
formed, from the fixed space of her father’s house to the equally static house of the 
15. J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. 
16. Ibidem.
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husband. The only movement made by a woman makes is connoted by the fact that the 
future bride is equated to a commodity: her first function in the marriage is to sanc-
tion the stipulation of a contract between two families. Thus man admits an element 
of trade to his house; she also becomes the mainstay of the hearth because she must 
fulfil another fundamental function: the guaranteed production of offspring. Woman, 
whom we have seen assimilated, as an element of her relationship, to the shifting wealth 
of the herd, is now identified in her procreative function with that of field of the herd. 
The paradox is that this does not previously embody her land but that of her husband. 
It is necessary for her to embody the land of her husband otherwise sons born of a 
furrow thus ploughed would have no religious title with which to occupy the paternal 
sphere and bear the fruit of the soil17. In terms of nature, the civic role of women was to 
produce citizens, that is, male heirs of householders who comprised the city; culturally, 
women acted as a pawn in a transaction between father-in-law and son-in-law18. 
Placing woman at the centre of the house does not, therefore, permit a woman to 
live autonomously in the domestic space as she cannot own it: she supervises it for he 
who has put her there to perform a role. This role characterises her and defines her as 
‘another’, bound by a twofold tie to that man – and only that man – who has the power 
to confer a sense of her existence. This depends on fulfilling a social role and contribut-
ing to generations of citizens but this does not guarantee her political status. Woman is 
banished from the polis, with its radical foreignness of political life; in the same instant, 
it precludes her from being virtuous, the possibility, that is, to be shaped by the exercis-
ing of virtue, which would render her as isos and homoios. On the contrary, she cannot 
participate in isonomia, precisely because this alienates the idea of sophrosune. Thus 
woman remains totally excluded from any type of public relationship.
However, it is well to remember that to woman is conceded a certain type 
of the moral virtues: all must partake of them, but not in the same way, but in such 
measure as is proper to each in relation to his own function. Hence the ruler must 
possess intellectual virtue in completeness […], while each of the other parties 
must have that share of this virtue which is appropriate to them. Hence […] the 
temperance of a woman and that of a man are not the same, nor their courage and 
justice, […] but the one is the courage of command, and the other that of subor-
dination, and the case is similar with the other virtues. 
17. Ibidem. 
18. J. Redfield, “L’uomo e la vita domestica”, in J.-P. Vernant (ed.), L’uomo greco, Laterza, Bari, 1997, p. 157.
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“This point therefore requires general consideration in relation to natural ruler and 
subject: is virtue the same for ruler and ruled, or different? […], we cannot say that the 
difference is to be one of degree, for ruling and being ruled differ in kind, and difference 
of degree is not a difference in kind at all”19. On the basis of such specific differences, 
woman is confined to the oikos, whose perimeter encompasses her condition of sub-
mission. This begs the question as to whether it is possible to focus on a line of flight in 
order to modify one’s separate but equal being to that of man.
The ancient Greeks have provided us with two figures representative of this yearning 
for conceptual autonomy, and they have been sought via the awareness of their own em-
bodiment. This awareness leads to a converging of being a woman with the practising of 
bodily experience, which is specifically female. 
The characteristics of one figure are found in Homer’s Odyssey: Penelope, who, sus-
pended and waiting for the return of her husband, forever separated in her role of wife, 
attempts to create a niche to take refuge and build her own existence. Penelope’s action 
is as subversive as it is belongs to the space-time in which she is obliged to live but 
to which she does not belong. Her daily weaving records her perfectly in the order of 
mother and faithful wife. She must free herself, so she dims the light of the sun, that 
is, the nous, which is traditionally ‘masculine’, and she closes in on herself in a space-
time of her own construction. The night-time is when she unpicks part of the shroud, 
prolonging indefinitely the waiting of her suitors. She makes a gesture which locates 
her beyond and against her role: the space of the loom is the space where she, hiding, is 
revealed as Penelope, a totally unique being. Whilst defying agreed canons, the gesture 
of Penelope’s freeing herself, however, maintains intact the equilibrium of the oikos. It 
is Telemachus – the man of the house – who imposes kratos on the orphan dwelling of 
Ulysses, silencing his mother and relegating her to ‘her’ rooms: “Nay, go to thy chamber, 
and busy thyself with thine own tasks, the loom and the distaff, and bid thy handmaids 
ply their tasks; but speech shall be for men, for all, but most of all for me; since mine is 
the authority [kratos] in the house ([oikos]”20.
The irreconcilability of the tension which animates oikos and polis violently bursts 
onto the stage in Sophocles’ Antigone. The resolute will to safeguard in a dignified man-
ner the body of the deceased brother moves Antigone towards the polis; the latter has 
determined by law the right of burial of Polynices. The legal impossibility of recognising 
19. Aristotle, Politics, I, 1260a, 13, 15-20; 1259b, 30-35.
20. Homer, Odyssey, I, 355, 360. On woman’s aphasia, see L. Irigaray, Speculum de l’autre femme, Paris, Ed. de Minuit, 
1974. See notably A. Cavarero, Nonostante Platone, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1990, pp. 13-32.
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such a right is the essence of the tragedy. The play collocates Antigone on the boundary 
between polis and oikos. The tie of blood which subdues her to the divine law of the oikos 
at the same time compels her to strike against the polis. The inevitability of this clash 
is proportional to its necessity: no woman has the right to enter the polis but, precisely 
because she has no knowledge of ‘male’ laws, Antigone cannot obey, therefore, she 
cannot free herself but she ‘contradicts’ these laws. Her saying ‘against’ is tantamount 
to saying ‘outside’. Her words and those of Creon are written in two complementary 
records: the a-political of the oikos, indeed the pre-politics of the polis, which are kept 
parallel to each other. “[Antigone] does not aim to substitute the order of Creon with 
another. Her Nomos is totally a-polis; she does not resist but opposes. An extraordi-
nary and amazing fact is that such a stark contrast takes place in the theatre of the 
polis – which here the totally separated elements are destined – despite themselves – to 
contradict themselves”21.
Evading the law of the polis by enduring from within, Penelope’s escape obtains her 
a micro-space within the macro-space of the oikos. The challenge of Antigone seems to 
be tragically more extreme: the same force which introduces her as a foreigner to the 
polis marks her definitive condemnation to death. “Creon knows that, where unlawful 
conduct is not sanctioned, all order in the polis would collapse”22. He is entrenched 
within the law of the polis, deciding not the death of the woman but to bury her alive, 
suspending her between life and death so as to admit her to enter the polis but denying 
her the political space. “Woman has a place in politics if she stays in the home […], that 
is, precisely when it includes her by excluding her (on an institutional level of politics, 
in the polis, the non-politics of the female is her political character). However, when she 
refutes her own circumstance, that is, the four walls of the house – no longer being an 
impossible, public dimension but an indefinable public space – politics no longer con-
trols her”23. Antigone can only remain in the border of the polis, when she who crosses 
therein lives no more.
The inside/outside polarity which supports the complementarity between polis 
and oikos defines the space of acting publically. It delineates the margins of this polis/
oikos space, confining the constitution of the self only to man, who is permitted to 
trans-form himself into a citizen. The institution of the political paideia in exercis-
ing virtue as a unique political experience splits its own aim: the idea of shaping an 
21. M. Cacciari, L’arcipelago, Adelphi, Milano, 1997, p. 44.
22. Ibidem, p. 43.
23. P. Amato, Antigone e Platone, Mimesis, Milano, 2006, p. 64. See also A. Cavarero, Corpo in figure, Feltrinelli, Milano, 
1995, pp. 17-62 whose analysis would deserve more attention.
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individual relating between equals in the polis is mirrored in the legitimisation of au-
thority of the same equals regarding those who live outside politics. Therefore, oikos is 
shaped as a space of domination where it must, out of necessity, impose itself on those 
who do not have the right to be subjects. This is because they are excluded from any 
type of public life. In this sense, woman becomes a subject who cannot be educated, 
in that access to public relations is prohibited to her. However, as a subject necessitat-
ing private relationships, that is, exercising power, she is a necessary pole and, for this 
reason, her moulded being coincides with her con-forming to such a role. 
Translated by Jane O. Davies
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